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Introduction
According to Congress, there are approximately forty-three
million Americans with disabilities.1 The Americans with Disabilities
Act (hereinafter ADA)2 is designed to ensure them equal opportunity
in all aspects of life.' Modeled largely on the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 4 the ADA extends protection to employment,5 public services,6
and "public accommodations and services operated by private
7
entities."
This note will focus on the impact of the ADA on that limited
class of public accommodations which provide entertainment to the
general public. 8 Further attention will be given to the special
accommodations provided to those who use wheelchairs or other
devices to assist in mobility.
The heart of the ADA is, of course, the statute itself. 9 In addition

to the statute, there are regulations for its implementation
promulgated by the Attorney General.1" Due in part to the "newness"
of the statute and in part to the tendency of private entities to settle

their disputes rather than go to trial, there is relatively little case law
explaining the ADA. The goal of this note is to both demonstrate that
current regulations provide insufficient guidance to businesses and
that the only route to a practical solution must come from the courts.

1. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1996) (addressing the size and scope of the
population of Americans with disabilities).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1996).
3. Id. § 12101(b). For a discussion of the ADA as a civil rights statute, see Robert L.
Burghdorf, Jr., "Equal Members of the Community": The Public Accommodations
Provisionsof the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 551 (1991).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1996).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
6. Id. §§ 12131-12165.
7. Id. §§ 12181-12189. Under Title Ill, jurisdiction is limited to those private entities
that "affect commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Title III has been held constitutional as
applied to these entities. See, e.g., Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes Franchisee,
844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (including, "a motion picture house, theater, concert hall,
stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment"). Note that although a sports arena
is a public accommodation for the purposes of Title III, a radio or television broadcast
from the same stadium is not. See Stoutenborough v. National Football League, 59 F.3d
580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
10. These regulations are mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1.2134 and are found in the Code
of Federal Regulations.
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Part I provides a basic overview of the ADA and its function.
Part II discusses the ADA in practice-specifically as it relates to
theaters, sports arenas, and other exhibition facilities. Finally, Part III
suggests solutions to the problems raised by the ADA in practice.

I
Statutory Overview
A. Disability Defined
"The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-(A) a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of having such
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such impairment.""i

12
Because this language is taken directly from the Rehabilitation Act,
its meaning is relatively well-settled. 3 The Code of Federal

Regulations provides some of the necessary additional interpretations.
For example, the Code of Federal Regulations defines the term
"physical or mental impairment" specifically to include orthopedic
impairments-the type of disability that would result in reliance on a
wheelchair or other mobility aid such as crutches or a walker. 14

"Major life activities" are defined by the Code as "caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."'15 Congress clearly intended to
11.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

12. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1996). The Rehabilitation Act refers to a "handicapped
individual" rather than "individual[s] with a disability." These terms are functionally
equivalent.
13. See, e.g., Smaw v. Virginia Dep't of Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(defining the term "physical or mental impairment"); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th
Cir. 1986) (defining "major life activity"); Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560 (7th. Cir.
1992) (defining a "record of such impairment"); Taylor v. U.S. Postal Service, 946 F.2d
1214 (6th Cir. 1991) (defining "being regarded as having such impairment").
14. "The phrase physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to, such
contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and
hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis,
cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning
disabilities, HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug
addiction, and alcoholism." 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1997). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)
(1996).
15. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (emphasis added). See also 7 C.F.R. § 1944.205 (1996); 11
C.F.R. § 6.103 (1996); 14 C.F.R. § 382.5 (1996); 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.201, 582.5, 891.305, and
891.505 (1996); 32 C.F.R. § 1699.103 (1996); 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009 (1996); 45 C.F.R. §§
1321.3 and 1385.3 (1996); 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (1996).
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include in the definition of a "qualified person with disability" one
who has a "record of such impairment"' 16 or is "regarded as having
such an impairment." Both of these definitions apply to individuals
who are treated as though they are disabled even though they may not
actually be disabled.1 7 People who require wheelchairs, walkers, canes,
or other mechanical aids to move around certainly meet the statutory
requirements necessary to be classified as a "qualified person with a
disability" as defined by the ADA. 8
B.

The Scope of Title III: Public Accommodations and Services Operated
by Private Entities

Title III of the ADA proscribes disparate treatment of the
disabled in their everyday lives. The legislative history of the Act
reflects congressional concern over the deleterious effects of
discrimination against people with disabilities: the large majority of
people with disabilities do not go to the movies, do not go to the
theater, do not go to see musical performances, and do not go to
19
sporting events.
Congress sought to remedy this problem by including "motion
picture house[s], theater[s], concert hall[s], stadi[a], or other place[s]
of exhibition or entertainment" in the definition of public
accommodations."z Making these facilities accessible to the disabled
would ensure that people with disabilities would be better able, and
thus more likely, to enjoy the same forms of entertainment as the
2
general population. '
C. Discrimination Defined
Discriminatory activities in public accommodations are defined as
"denial of participation," 22 "provision of an unequal benefit,, 23 and/or
"provision of a separate benefit., 24 The ADA mandates that
16. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104
17. See generally id.
18. Id.
19. Kari L. Rutherford, Comment, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct (ADA); Title
III: "What is Readily Achievable?," 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 329, 330 (1995).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C). For a detailed list of public accommodations, see 42

U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1996).
21.
22.
23.

See, e.g., A&P 136 CONG. REC. D623 (May 17, 1990).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).

24. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
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accommodations be provided "in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of the individual."2 5 To that end, public
accommodations have an affirmative duty to provide the disabled with
access-just what type and degree of access remains unclear.
For the purposes of Title III, discrimination includes the
following:
(i) the imposition . . . of eligibility criteria that screen out an

individual ...or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully
and equally enjoying any ... facilities ... or accommodations... ;
(ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications . . . when such
modifications are necessary to afford . . . accommodations to
individuals with disabilities ...; (iii) a failure to take such steps as

may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is
excluded ... or otherwise treated differently than other individuals
because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services ...; (iv) a

failure to remove architectural barriers, and communication barriers
that are structural in nature, in existing facilities . ..where such

removal is readily achievable;2 6 and (v) where an entity can

demonstrate that the removal of a barrier . . . is not readily
achievable, a failure to make such ... facilities or accommodations

available through alternative methods if such methods are readily
achievable.27

The ADA includes in the definition of discrimination the "failure
to design and construct facilities ...

that are readily accessible to and

usable by individuals with disabilities, except where an entity can
demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable ....
"28 The ADA also
defines as discriminatory the alteration of a facility without making it
"readily accessible" to the "maximum extent feasible." 29 The
emphasis here is on the responsibility of private entities in the
business of providing places of public accommodation to build and
remodel so that their facilities provide access for the disabled.
25.

Id. § 12182(b)(1)(B). See also 28 C.F.R. § 36.203.

26. "Readily achievable" means easily accomplished and able to be carried out
without much difficulty or expense. In determining whether an action is readily achievable
factors to be considered include: (1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this
part; (2) The overall financial resources ... of the site or sites involved in the action... ;
(4)If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent corporation or entity; the
overall size of the parent corporation or entity ....28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996). "[Tlhe
financial ability of any business is key to the court's definition of what modifications are
'readily achievable' under ADA, experts say." Sarah Thailing, A Lawsuit Spurred by the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct Could Prove Costly to Business at Large if Jurisprudence
Rules that it is... Paydayfor the ADA, S.F. Bus. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1993, at 1.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). See also 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (1996).
28. Id. § 12183(a)(1).
29. Id. § 12183(a)(2).
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The Code of Federal Regulations explains that the term "readily
achievable" is a fluid concept; its meaning is dependent upon the
specific situation-both the requisite alterations and the needs of the
facility. 30 The statute also relies heavily on the term "reasonable."
This too is an ambiguous concept that does not lend itself to precise
definition.
D. Enforcement
The ADA makes enforcement the responsibility of the Attorney
General: "The Attorney General shall investigate alleged violations of
[Title III], and shall undertake periodic reviews of compliance of
covered entities under [Title III].,,31 The Attorney General is also
responsible for the promulgation of regulations and standards for
32
determining compliance for covered entities.
In addition to being enforceable by the Attorney General, the
ADA carries with it a private right of action. 33 Through this provision,
those people actually affected by discrimination are able to enforce
the provisions of the ADA.
E.

Available Remedies

"The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000a-3(a) of
[the Civil Rights Act of 1964] 3' are the remedies and procedures [Title
III] provides to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on
the basis of disability in violation of [42 U.S.C. §12183].",3 Injunctive
relief ordering the alteration of facilities, "requiring the provision of
an auxiliary aid or service, modification of a policy, or provision of
alternative methods" may also be granted.3 6
30. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. See also supra note 26.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(A)(i).
32. See id. § 12134(a).
33. See id. § 12188(a).
34. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for "a civil action for preventative relief,
including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or
other order . . ." and, at the court's discretion, "a reasonable attorney's fee" to the
prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 2000a-3(b) (1996). Compensatory or other
damages are not an available remedy under this act.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a). 42 U.S.C. §12183 applies to new construction and alterations
in public accommodations and commercial facilities. Because the Civil Rights Act of 1964
does not provide for money damages to private plaintiffs, such damages are not allowed in
private suits; they can only be awarded in cases instigated by the Attorney General. See
Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2).
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In actions instituted by the Attorney General, a wider range of
remedies are available.37 In a civil action instituted by the Attorney
General,
[T]he court-(A) may grant any equitable relief that such court
considers to be appropriate ... ; (B) may award such other relief as
the court considers to be appropriate, including monetary damages.
• . ; (C) may, to vindicate the public interest, assess a civil penalty
against the entity in an amount-(i) not exceeding $50,000 for a first
violation; and (ii) not exceeding $100,000 for any subsequent
violation. 38
The statute directs "the court" to take into account the entity's
"good faith effort or attempt to comply" with the ADA in
39
determining what penalty to impose.
Intent to discriminate is not a necessary element of a prima facie
case under the ADA.4 0 That is to say that, while a defendant's
attempts to provide access are relevant to a court's decision, they are
by no means conclusive. Even if the unintended results of a practice
are discriminatory, there may be an ADA violation. This is based in
Rehabilitation Act cases which do not require plaintiffs to prove that
defendants intended to discriminate, only that they did discriminate.4 1
To require otherwise would undermine the very purpose of the ADA;
the idea behind the ADA is the elimination of all discrimination
against the disabled whether intentional or not.
II
The ADA in Practice
In general, Title III violations can be divided into two basic
categories-existing facilities and new construction or alteration. For
existing facilities, the Act requires only reasonable modifications to
ensure access. 42 For new construction or alteration, Title III requires

37. See, e.g., id. § 12188(b).
38. Id. §§ 12188(b)(2)(A)-(C). Punitive damages are specifically disallowed by the
statute. Id. § 12188(b)(4).
39. Id. § 12188(b)(5).
40. See Mayberry, 843 F. Supp. at 1165 (courts will look to Rehabilitation Act cases in
determining whether intent to discriminate is an essential element of an ADA Title III
cause of action). See also Rothman v. Emory Univ., No. 93-c-1240, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4002, at *9 (N.D. I11.1994)("[t]he ADA is interpreted consistently with the [Rehabilitation
Act], and therefore the same reasoning is applicable to claims under both [A]cts").
41. See, e.g., Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 289-90 (2d Cir. 1990); Sanders
by Sanders v. Marquette Pub. Sch., 561 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2).

HASTINGS COMM/ENT

L.J.

[VOL. 20:897

that a facility be "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities, 4 3 a standard of mandatory accessibility. The discussion
below is divided into three areas: (1) theaters, with an emphasis on
existing facilities; (2) sports arenas, with an emphasis on new
construction; and (3) other exhibition facilities.
A. Theaters

Movie theaters are specifically listed as public accommodations in
Title III of the ADA.44 Thus, they are required to make reasonable
accommodation for the disabled.45 Just what it means to make
"reasonable accommodation" remains at issue, particularly for
existing facilities.
In applying the ADA to newly constructed movie theaters, the
statute and regulations are relatively clear and easy to apply. Title III
prohibits facilities from providing a separate benefit to the disabled
and requires that accommodations be afforded in the most integrated
setting possible. 46 For mobility impaired patrons of movie theaters,
this means that accessible seating should be scattered throughout the
auditorium. 47 In newly constructed theaters, seating can no longer be
confined to the back row as it is in most existing theaters; disabled
patrons must be given the option to sit in the front, middle, or back of
the theater just as the able-bodied are. The requirements of the ADA
are less clear with regard to compliance by existing theaters.
Prior to the passage of the ADA, a variety of access regulations
were in place, primarily state and local human rights laws. 48 But,
because there were no federal regulations or standards, accessibility
varied greatly across the country. The ADA was intended to solve this
problem; unfortunately, it has not yet fulfilled its promise.

43.

Id. § 12183(a).
Id. § 12181(7)(C).
45. This is true even when a private company operates the theater in a space leased
from the Department of Transportation, an arm of the executive branch that is exempted
44.

from the ADA. See Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D.D.C.

1994).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(B).
47. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) (1996).
48. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64
(1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519 (1996); IOWA CODE § 216.7 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
44-1002 (1997); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4566-A (West
1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:16 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-7-3 (Michie 1996);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40 (McKinney 1996).
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The most prominent case involving a theater chain began as a
state-law suit in 1991. "[T]wo women in wheelchairs sued the United
Artiste [sic] EmeryBay multiplex, charging that they had to sit in a
'degrading and inferior' location behind a low wall at the back of the
theater."4 9 At that time, the ADA was not yet in effect;5 the women's
claim was based exclusively in state law. 51 In 1993, Connie Arnold, the
plaintiff, moved to add a similar claim under the ADA and the suit
was removed to federal court.52
In a 1994 opinion, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California granted plaintiff's motion to certify the
suit as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.5 3 The case never made it to trial,
however; United Artists reached a settlement in April 1996. 54
Under the terms of the settlement, United Artists agreed to
provide dispersed wheelchair seating and to modify 1% of the seats in
existing theaters to have folding or removable aisle-side armrests
installed in order to facilitate the transfer of wheelchair patrons into
theater seats. 55 While denying liability, United Artists also agreed to
pay damages to the individuals involved in the suit and to set up a
56
fund for disabled moviegoers.
It is unclear whether the impetus for settlement by companies
such as United Artists is a belief that its facilities are not in
compliance, uncertainty about the state of compliance, or simply the
high cost of litigation. The problem, many maintain, is that the ADA
fails to clearly define "readily achievable," the standard by which
accommodations are to be judged.57 Without clarity, businesses are
49.
50.

Thailing, supra note 26.
The relevant provisions of Title III did not become effective until January 1992. 42

U.S.C. § 12181.
51. See Thailing, supra note 26.
52. See Jennifer Cohen, Arnold v. United Artists Theater Circuit; Peck v. United Artists
Theater Circuit, RECORDER, Apr. 15, 1993, at 5; Jorge Aquino, Handicap-Access Claim
Reinstated Against Theater Chain, RECORDER, Dec. 14, 1993, at 4. Peck v. United Artists
involved the theater's alleged failure to provide assisted listening devices to hearing
impaired patrons, and it is beyond the scope of this note.
53. See Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 443 (N.D. Cal.
1994). A Rule 23(b) class action is the standard class action which allows a combination of
small, almost identical, claims into one large action so as to pool plaintiff resources and
achieve one consistent result. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)
54. See Paul Richter, Coming Soon to a UA Theater Near You: Better Access for the
Disabled,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17,1996, at D1.
55. See Theaters to Get Retrofits, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Apr. 29, 1996, at 21.
56. See Richter, supra note 54.
57. Thailing, supra note 26, and accompanying text.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[VOL. 20:897

forced to make their best effort to comply, not knowing if their efforts
58
will be "good enough."
In a preliminary decision in Arnold v. United Artists Theatre
Circuit,5 9 the presiding judge ruled that seating for disabled patrons
must be dispersed throughout the theater "[t]o the extent that it is
readily achievable."60 The judge in that case "based his decision on a
manual published by the state agency that writes disability access
regulations." 6 1 The same agency, the California Division of the State
Architect, sent conflicting information to United Artists in 1993.62
While the apparent inconsistency here is with state regulations and
not the ADA, the same confusion abounds with implementation of
the ADA.6 3
The Code of Federal Regulations requires that facilities provide
accommodation which is not separate or distinct from the
accommodation provided to the general public. 64 "This general
requirement [that accommodation be provided in an integrated
setting] would appear to categorically prohibit 'segregated' seating for
persons in wheelchairs. Section 36.304 [of the Code of Federal
Regulations], however, only requires removal of architectural barriers
to the extent that removal is 'readily achievable.' 65 When seat
removal is not readily achievable, the Code allows a facility to provide
some other means, such as portable chairs, to permit disabled patrons
66
to be seated with their able-bodied companions.
In some cases it may not be readily achievable for auditoriums or
theaters to remove seats to allow individuals in wheelchairs to sit next
to accompanying family members or friends. In these situations, the
"final rule" 67 retains the requirement that the public accommodation

58. "'Business wants to comply, but the ADA is so vague,' said Kerwin Lee, an
architect and consultant with Rolf Jensen & Associates in Concord, part of a 150-person
firm that helps architecture firms comply with building codes. 'They are groping in the
dark,' Lee said. 'The only means of resolution seems to be lawsuits like [Arnold v. United
Artists]"' Id.
59. 158 F.R.D. 439.
60. Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
61. Jorge Aquino, Fightingto Get a Good Seat, RECORDER, Sept. 6, 1994, at 1.
62. See id. (the agency stated that movie theaters were not required to integrate
seating for the disabled).
63. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
64. 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(a).
65. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B (1996)(referencing § 36.308).

66.

28 C.F.R. § 36.308(a)(2) (1996).

67.

In using the term "final rule" I intend to refer to the ADA in its final form.
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provide portable chairs or other means to allow the accompanying
individuals to sit with the persons in wheelchairs. "Persons in
wheelchairs should have the same opportunity to enjoy movies, plays,
and similar events with their families and friends" as do other
patrons. 68 "The final rule specifies that portable chairs or other means
to permit family members or companions to sit with individuals who
use wheelchairs must be provided only when it is readily achievable to
69
do so."
It is apparent from this rather short passage that the ADA is far
from clear. At one point, the "final rule" is said to require that
portable chairs be provided for companions when seat removal is not
possible; two sentences later, the so-called "final rule" requires
70
portable chairs only when their provision is "readily achievable."
Later, the same regulations refer to the "potential safety hazard
created by the use of portable chairs," leaving open the question of
71
what really is or ought to be the "final rule."
In those cases where the only acceptable method of compliance is
removal of architectural barriers (i.e., seat removal), the requirements
of the regulations are more specific. The requirements for existing
facilities are written so that they may not exceed the standards of the
ADA Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG"). 72 "For example, section
4.33 of ADAAG only requires wheelchair spaces be provided in more
than one location when the seating capacity of the assembly area
exceeds 300 .... Similarly, section 4.1.3(19) of ADAAG requires six
accessible wheelchair locations in an assembly area with 301 to 500
seats." 73 Thus, most modern theaters will require a maximum of six
wheelchair-accessible locations. 74 The regulations do not address how
many "seats" there ought to be in each of these locations. In the
absence of more stringent requirements, it is reasonable to expect that
most areas will have enough room for only one wheelchair.

68. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B (referencing §36.308).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id. The relationship between the ADA and the ADAAG is set out in 28 C.F.R. Pt.
36, App. A (1996).
72. 28 C.F.R. § 36.308(a)(3).
73. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B §4.33.3.
74. Modern theaters tend to be small because in an effort to compete with television
and videotapes, theaters have chosen to offer more of a selection of movies by dividing up
available space into smaller theaters.
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The additional requirement that seating "[p]rovide lines of sight
and choice of admission price comparable to those for the general
public" 75 is fairly easy to achieve in movie theaters where patrons pay
a flat rate for attendance (i.e., one not based on their choice of seat)
and, as a rule, remain seated. This requirement becomes more
problematic when patrons are inclined to stand, as they often do at
events such as concerts or sporting events.
B. Sports Arenas

76

Sports arenas present special problems in ADA compliance both
for existing facilities and new construction. In those facilities, ablebodied patrons are likely to stand up during all or part of the
exhibition. "The [Department of Justice], in endorsing the Atlanta
[Olympic] facilities, has found that facilities should be designed so that
'at the height of excitement a wheelchair user can enjoy the moment
like everyone else.'" 77"'Enhanced sightlines78are a major issue for
existing structures, and especially new ones.'
The issue of enhanced sightlines is greatest in new construction
because new construction is held to a higher standard than is the
alteration of existing facilities.79 In a suit filed in June 1996, the
Paralyzed Veterans of America alleged that Washington D.C.'s MCI
Center would not meet the requirements of the ADA when it was
completed because "the vast majority of proposed wheelchair
locations provide wheelchair users with obstructed views of the
80
action."
In its suit, the Paralyzed Veterans of America named both the
architect and the owner/operator of the arena as defendants. 81 Ellerbe
75. 28 C.F.R. § 36.308(1)(ii)(B).
76. The discussion here is primarily centered on the MCI Center, an arena in
Washington D.C.. It serves both as a concert venue and as a sports facility. My focus will
be on its use as the latter.
77. James Zoltak, Olympic Venues Declared Model for ADA Access, AMUSEMENT
Bus., July 22, 1996, at 13.
78.

Tom Powell, New Hot Items and Lawsuits: McGuire Examines Outcome of ADA,

AMUSEMENT BuS., July 29, 1996, at 17.

79. 28 C.F.R. § 36.308(3)(b).
80.

Sherie Winston, Accommodating Disabled at Issue, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC.,

July 1, 1996, at 14 (emphasis added). See also Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Ellerbe
Becket, 950 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1996) [hereinafter PVA II]; Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. Ellerbe Becket, 950 F. Supp. 393 (D.D.C. 1996) [hereinafter PVA II1].
81. Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Ellerbe Becket, 945 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996)
[hereinafter PVA I].
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Becket, the architect, was dismissed as a defendant in July 1996,
leaving only the owner/operators.8 2 In dismissing the claim against the
architect, the judge pointed to the statute, noting that it "explicitly
places responsibility for compliance with ADA on owners, operators,
lessors and lessees," not designers.8 3 The Justice Department then
84
filed its own suit against Ellerbe Becket in October.
In its decision, the district court ruled that "the ADA requires
that wheelchair locations have 'lines of sight comparable to those of
the general public."' 85 In addition, the court discussed the other two
elements of ADA accessibility requirements: integration - that
accessible seats not be segregated from seats for the able-bodied - and
86
dispersal - that seats must be scattered throughout the facility.
While a design cannot fully pursue each of these three featuresperfect integration is incompatible with enhanced sightlines, for
example-architects need not sacrifice one goal to achieve another.
Instead, a design can substantially meet all three goals, combining
enhanced sightlines with substantial integration and adequate
dispersal. Wheelchair users would not choose to forego enhanced
sightlines in order to achieve better integration or dispersal, and a new
arena like the MCI Center can be designed so that they do not have
87

to.

In essence this means that wheelchair users must be given the
same options as the able-bodied, a requirement that is spelled out in
the statute and regulations.88 Why then does this confusion remain?
One possible answer is that the Justice Department has failed to
provide clear, consistent interpretations of its own regulations. In

82. PVA 1, 945 F. Supp. at 1. But cf United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp.
1262, 1264 (D. Minn. 1997) (Denying architect's motion to dismiss claim, which sought

liability for designing sports stadiums in violation of ADA).
83. Winston, supra note 80.
84.

See Sherie Winston, Justice Sues Arena Architect, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Oct.

21, 1996, at 11. "Says [Department of] Justice's [assistant attorney for civil rights] Patrick:
'We believe architects-just like owners-are responsible for designing new facilities so
that they are meaningfully accessible."' Id. See also United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc.,
976 F. Supp. 1262,1267 (D. Minn. 1997).

85.

PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at 402. See also Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music

Entertainment Centre, 968 F. Supp. 210, 219 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that the requirement

of "comparable sightlines" does not require that persons in wheelchairs be able to see over
the heads of standing spectators).
86.
87.

PVA III, 950 F. Supp. at 398.
Id.

88.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 36.308(1)(a)(ii)(B).
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PVA III, the court determined that the Justice Department had not
established clearly what it required of a facility in order to be in
89
compliance.
Prior to 1993, the Department [of Justice] did not officially insist on
enhanced lines of sight; indeed, in one case the Deputy Chief of the
Public Access Section explicitly told Major League Baseball owners
that the ADA did not require enhanced sightlines. Since that time,
the Department has discussed the issues of sightlines and dispersal,
but the Technical Assistance Manual Supplement of 1994 and the
May 1996 "Accessible Stadiums" release are the only public
statements to suggest a requirement of enhanced sightlines. These
remain the most current statements of Justice Department's
interpretation of these issues, however, and the Court held on
October9 ° 21 that they state the interpretation which binds the
parties.
But, "[t]he Department of Justice has never .
require[d] that
100% of the wheelchair seating provide enhanced sightlines. Instead,
taking the Olympic Stadium for a model as the Justice Department
has directed, a facility is in compliance with the ADA regulations if a
substantialpercentage of seats provide those sightlines." 91 Applying a
"flexible test of substantial compliance," the court ruled that the MCI
Center, as proposed, did not comply with the requirements of the
ADA, but that compliance might be achieved with only "moderate
92
changes."
C. Other Exhibition Facilities
The problems of ADA compliance are not limited to movie
theaters and sports arenas; other facilities designed for public
exhibition and/or entertainment also have difficulty complying with
the law. Concert venues, for example, share some of the problems of
theaters and sports arenas but also have problems unique to their type
Q
of facility.
For most people, the biggest challenge in attending a concert is
getting tickets. For the disabled, securing appropriate accommodation
once they have gone through the same hassle of purchasing tickets is
often an even bigger challenge.93 For example, in the case of

89.
90.
91.
92.

PVA II, 950 F.Supp. at 399. See also Caruso, 968 F. Supp. at 216.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
Id.

93.

See Doc Robertson, The Wheelchair View of Concert Venues, L.A. TIMES, July 27,

1992, at F3.
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amphitheaters, the audience is often situated on a slope which can be

difficult for patrons in wheelchairs to navigate. 94 New facilities must
ensure that any such slope is navigable by those using wheelchairs,
walkers, crutches, etc. For existing facilities, accommodation can take
on a variety of forms; employees can be provided to assist a
wheelchair-bound patron to his designated seat or the patron can be
reassigned to a seat which does not require traveling along a too-steep
95

slope.
The problem of obstructed sightlines discussed

above in

conjunction with sports arenas is equally applicable to concert

venues. 96 It is just as likely that able-bodied spectators will stand
during a concert as it is at fourth and goal during a playoff game. Like
sports arenas, concert venues often provide variably-priced seating,
and the regulations require that people with disabilities have the same
choice of seat location and price as the general public. 97 In essence,

the impact of the ADA on concert venues is a hybrid of its impact on
arenas and movie theaters.
In contrast to sports arenas and movie theaters, where only the

owner and/or operator is liable for ADA violations, in the case of
concert venues and other places of exhibition, entertainers are also
liable for any ADA violations.9 8 The idea behind this is that "smart"

entertainers will refuse to perform in places that do not meet ADA
guidelines thus encouraging owners to comply, thereby creating
another level of private enforcement. 99 Placing liability on individual

94. See id.
95. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v) (provision requiring that facilities be
made available through "alternative methods"); 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A; 36 C.F.R. §
1192.23 (1996) (maximum allowable slope); and 28 C.F.R. § 36.305 (1996) (alternatives to
barrier removal).
96. See Zoltak, supra note 77. As a specific example of this problem:
The Garth Brooks' show at the Tacoma Dome is a prime example of how [the
disabled] are overlooked and ignored. My husband waited in line just as long as
everyone else and paid the same price for our tickets. He saw the show; I did not.
We did not get to sit together and my entire view of the concert consisted of
people's backs, an empty stage, and a quick glimpse of Garth on a ladder.
Overlooked-View of Concert Obstructed for Those in Wheelchairs, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept.

12, 1993, at F6.
97. 28 C.F.R. § 36.308.
98. See Coral Mackenzie, Includes Restaurants, Theaters: Sweeping Law Hits Private
Establishments Next Year, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., Sept. 23, 1991, at 6. Allocation of
liability can still be affected contractually; the law is not absolute. Id.
99. Id.
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entertainers essentially adds another level of private enforcement in
the entertainers themselves.
III

Suggested Solutions
Problems associated with the ADA are fairly easy to see, but
enforcement remains inconsistent. No one - not the Department of
Justice, not the courts, not architects, not business owners - seems to
know exactly what the ADA requires. In some cases, the law can even
lead to absurd results."° Most of the urban myth surrounding the
horrific results of the ADA is just that-myth. But, many of these

stories "seem to be fair examples of applying well-intentioned laws 1or
01
policies to achieve a result which can plausibly be called 'perverse.'
How then can the goals of the ADA be met without leading to absurd
unintended consequences?
The statute charges the Attorney General with the job of
promulgating regulations for implementation of the ADA. 102 Some
argue that those regulations, as they now exist, are insufficient. 103 I
argue that the regulations should not try to be all things to all people;
they should only provide a framework within which the courts can
decide questions of compliance on a case-by-case basis using a more
100. Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans
With DisabilitiesAct. How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1311, 1312 n.7 (1991).
In the most striking... stor[y], Mother Teresa's "Missionaries of Charity" wanted
to renovate two old buildings in order to care for the homeless. New York City's
Office for People With Disabilities, however, insisted that the nuns install
elevators. The nuns had planned to carry any disabled person up the stairs
themselves, just as they had carried the disabled in Calcutta. The director of the
office informed them, "no, you don't carry people up and down in our society.
That's not acceptable here." So the nuns, who could not afford an elevator,
abandoned the project altogether.
Id. (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (1996).
103. See, e.g., PVA 111, 950 F. Supp. at 398.
The Department has not established a single, clear interpretation, but has instead
left a nebulous record, comprised mostly of informal documents, press releases,
announcements, and correspondence. This has not provided clear guidance to
architects, who have been left at best an educated guess as to the design features
required to comply with ADA regulations. The Justice Department decided
against a rule-making process, which would have left a concrete, workable record
from which to discern a standard.
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common-sense approach. Places of public accommodation, by their
very nature, vary one from the next. As a class, they lend themselves
to general guidelines but not to specific requirements. It therefore
makes sense for the courts to make individual determinations based
on all of the relevant facts.
A.

Number of Wheelchair Accessible Locations

The Regulations use a so-called "one percent plus one" formula
for determining the number of wheelchair spaces required. 10 4 Under
this formula, newly constructed facilities are required to provide
wheelchair seating equal to one per cent of their capacity plus one
additional seat. At first blush this seems like a good idea: the
regulation is relatively clear in its requirements. While this is true, it
does not account for the financial impact that unfilled wheelchair
seating may have on the owner of a facility. 1°5 The answer to this
problem may be as simple as removable seats. 10 6 Seats that fold out of
the way would provide the utmost flexibility and economy for facility
operators and the utmost choice and convenience for wheelchair
users. Because such seats would be folded out of the way only when
there was a need for them, facilities would not have to let unused
wheelchair spaces sit unsold. In the interest of assuring access for
disabled patrons, it would be reasonable to require that some portion
of the potential wheelchair seats be reserved (i.e., not sold to the
general public) until the "last minute." For wheelchair users, this type
of arrangement could potentially provide the greatest choice of seat
placement and price, when applicable. Owners would be able to
charge wheelchair users the same price for their chosen seats as ablebodied patrons because they would not be forced to sit in any given
area of the facility.

104. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A (this requirement comes from Section 4.1.3(19) of the
ADAAG).

28 C.F.R. § 36.406 (1996).
Robert P. Bennett noted in PARAPLEGIA NEWS:
The new baseball stadium in Baltimore has a seating arrangement most people
seem to like: About 400 conventional seats simply fold out of the way to make

105.

106.

room for wheelchairs ....

This same technology can be used effectively in a

movie theater [or other places of exhibition], and it would not cause the same
reduction of conventional seating wheelchair stalls now cause [sic].
Robert P. Bennett, ADA Goes to the Movies, PARAPLEGIA NEWS, Apr. 1994, at 53.
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Portable Chairs as a Method of Integration

One method of compliance that may provide a workable solution
to the problem of segregated seating for the disabled'1 7 is the
provision of portable chairs so that companions may sit with the
disabled. But this raises questions of safety of all patrons and comfort
for the able-bodied companion. 0 8 Portable chairs can be hazardous in
the event of an emergency if they block escape routes. Additionally,
very few types of portable chairs provide even a modicum of comfort.
It would seem that the jury is still out on the sufficiency and
advisability of portable seating as a method of ADA compliance.
Again, a better solution could be found in the use of fold-away seats.
C.

Enhanced Sightlines, Lessons Learned from Paralyzed Veterans of
America

Ensuring that wheelchair-bound patrons are able to see all the
action is potentially the most difficult objective to achieve because it is
dependent upon the behavior and actions of other patrons. The
operators of the MCI Center proposed two solutions to the problem
of impaired sightlines: (1) refusing to sell those seats in front of
wheelchair spaces; and (2) an "'education and enforcement"' policy
which would discourage patrons seated in front of wheelchair patrons
from standing up during play.' 9 The first solution is akin to a
structural change. In order to ensure that those seats remained empty,
they would have to be removed or cordoned off in some manner. This
raises problems of lost revenue. The solution is likely the same as with
fixed wheelchair seatiiig. By using seats that fold out of the way, they
would have to be removed only if the designated wheelchair spaces
behind them were occupied.
Owners and operators have suggested that they simply enforce a
"no standing" policy for those seated in front of disabled people. This
is apt to be less effective, particularly in the context of sporting events.
People tend to stand in reaction to some excitement on the field or
stage. In those situations, it is unlikely that able-bodied patrons would
remain seated at all times, thus subjecting the wheelchair user to

107. "Since wheelchair seating is usually in an open area or 'pen' at the back of the
auditorium, a wheelchair user can't sit near a nonwheeler." Bennett, supra note 106.
108. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B.
109. See PVA III, 950 F.Supp. at 398.
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increased attention when he sought to enforce the no-standing
10
policy.
IV
Conclusion
Even the most vocal critics of the ADA appear to support the
Act's goals."' However, disagreements arise when the ADA is
applied to real-life situations. The disabled clamor for total equality of
access and enjoyment while private entities claim that they are doing
the best they can under the circumstances. The statute and regulations
often provide only generalized requirements, worsening the situation.
Congress has assigned to the Attorney General the duty and
power to interpret [the ADA] and to set standards for enforcement
and compliance. Unfortunately, while the Department of Justice
issued broad Standards for Accessible Design, it has not seen fit to
role by providing concrete
step up to its statutorily mandated
112
guidelines for architects and builders.
As a result of the Regulations' near complete failure to provide
adequate guidance, courts are forced to step in to enforce compliance
on a case-by-case basis. While this is not the method envisioned by the
statute, 113 it is possibly the most equitable and effective means of
enforcement.
To be successful in its goals, the ADA must reach a delicate balance
between the needs of the disabled and the financial realities facing
private entities. This can only be accomplished by the courts with their
ability to judge cases individually.

110. The policy against standing would only be in effect in sections where wheelchair
patrons are located; therefore all ambulatory patrons in the arena will be permitted to
stand during play, except those seated in front of wheelchair patrons. This situation
presents the very real danger of subjecting wheelchair users to resentment or hostility.
PVA 11, 950 F. Supp. at 403.
111. Stuhlbarg, supra note 100, at 1311 n. 5 (support for the goals of the ADA is
virtually undisputed).
112. PVA 11, 950 F. Supp. at 394.
113. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12134, 12204.

